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BENDER SHIPBUILDING & REPAIR CO., INC. v. BRASILEIRO
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, 13 June 1989
874 F.2d 1551
A marine insurance Builder's Risk policy including protection and indemnity is not intended to incorporate insured's
contractual liability to a co-insured for liquidated damages.
FACTS: Bender Shipbuilding & Repair Co., Inc. !"Bender")
contracted to build a floating drydock for Todd Shipyards Corpo
ration ("Todd"). Bender agreed to construct and deliver the
drydock on or before May 27, 1982. The contract provided for a
liquidated damages payment of $5,300.00 per day beyond the
delivery date for a maximum period of 90 days.
Bender purchased a Builder's Risk insurance policy from The
Hartford Insurance Company of Alabama !"Hartford"). The
purpose of the policy was to cover the floating drydock during
construction and delivery. Under this policy, Bender and Todd
were listed as co-insured and co-loss payees.
On July 6, 1982, a severe storm caused three sections of the
drydock at Bender's yard to break their moorings and be blown
west across the Mobile River. On the western bank of the river
the floating drydock collided with the M!V Itapura, a moored
vessel. The floating drydock and the M/V Itapura were
damaged. Repairs of the drydock delayed delivery to Todd.
Todd instituted a claim for liquidated damages for delay of
delivery of the drydock pursuant to the contract with Bender.
Bender sought coverage for the 1 iquidated damages claim under
the Hartfnrd n-Jl1cy. Hartford denied coverage. Bender paid
Todd $353, 1�7 .26 in February of 1983 under a joint agreement
and mutual release of claims.
Bender instituted suit against Hartford on November 22,1985
in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Alabama. As it was agreed by the parties that no genuine issues
of material fact existed, the suit was brought before the district
court on Hartford's motion for summary judgment and Bender's
cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court denied
Hartford's summary judgment motion on the basis that its
burden to demonstrate "clearly and unambiguously" that no
coverage was intended was not met. Bender's cross-motion for
summary judgment was granted as the court concluded that "no
clear language in the policy demonstrated an intent. . . to exclude
from the coverage liquidated damages resulting from a colli
sion ... ." Hartford made an interlocutory appeal of the order
granting summary judgment under 28 U.S.C. §1292!aH3J.

including, but not limited to, loss of earnings or use of the
Vessel, howsoever caused, except to the extent, if any, covered
by the Collision Liability or the Protection and Indemnity
clauses of this Policy.' " Bender argued for coverage under the
Collision Liability or "Running Down" clause which provided:
"lilf the Vessel shall come into collision with any other ship or
vessel, and the Assured ... in consequence of the Vessel being at
fault shall become liable to pay and shall pay by way of damages
to any other person ... the Underwriters will pay the Assured... . "
The protection of the Collision Liability clause must be determined
by looking at the reasonable understanding. of the parties.
Harbor Towing Corp. v. Atlantic Mut.Ins. Co., 189 F.2d 409 !4th
Cir. 195U. Hartford did not undertake contractual risks of
which it apparently had no knowledge. The court determined
that such an expansion of Hartford's own risk overextends the
"reasonable expectations of both insurer and insured." The
court expressed that an extension of the coverage of the Collision
Liability clause to the risks created by the Bender-Todd contract
would cause higher premiums, generally undesirable in the
maritime industry.
Historically, the Collision Liability clause limited underwriter
liability to indemnification of shipowners for damages done to
other vessels by the insured vessel. General Mut Ins Co. v.
Sherwood (The Emily), 55 U.S. (14 How.) 35 1 <1853). Bender
argues that the Collision Liability clause has been held to cover
contractual liabilities which arise out of a collision. Marine
Transit Corp. v. Northwestern Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 67 F.2d
544 (2d Cir. 1933). Bender's effort to avoid exclusion under the
"delay and disruption damages" clause, as provided for under
the general policy conditions, fails here. The court illustrated
that the cargo under contract in Marine Transit was on a vessel
other than the insured's,whereas Bender's liability arose from a
contract involving the insured vessel itself.
The status of Todd and Bender as co-insureds and co-loss
payees caused the district co u rt to find liquidated damages
payable to Todd as damages from loss of use of the drydock. The
district court erroneously relied on the Collision Liability clause
in allowing an insured to collect for damage on its own vessel.
Further, Todd's status precluded its qualification as "any other
person" within the meaning of the Collision Liability clause.
The collision between the floating drydock and theM!V Itapura
was on navigable waters. The nexus between the alleged wrong
ful conduct and some maritime activity established admiralty
jurisdiction in tort. Foremost Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S.
668 !1982!; Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. Cleveland, 409 U.S.
249 !_1972!. Maritime jurisdiction over the collision gave the
dtstn�t court d1scretwn to hear pendant state law claims arising
out of the same transactiOn and occurrence. Hagans v. Lavine
4 15 U.S. 528 ( 1974). The resolutwn of the admiralty claim did
not bar the d1stnct court from retammg pendant Jurisdiction
over the Issue of msurance coverage, a related state claim.
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 <1966).
The court of appeals reversed the district court's summary
judgment for Bender finding that the Bender-Todd contract was
not incorporated into the Builder's Risk policy and that the
liquidated damages paid by Bender to Todd were not intended to
be covered under the policy.

ISSUES: ! 1l Whether a marine insurance Builder's Risk policy
is intended to incorporate insured's contractual liability to a
co-insured for liquidated damages under its Collision Liability
clause·}
!2l D1d the district court err by adjudicating
pendant state law issues between a shipbuilder and insurer
when juris-diction was based upon Admiralty"�
ANALYSIS: In its reversal of the lower court, the Eleventh
Circuit rendered judgment for Hartford because the policy was
unambiguous and indicated no intention to cover liquidated
damages owed by Bender to Todd pursuant to their contract.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the distnct court that an
msurance policy should be construed against the insurer which
is in a better pos1tion to limit its exposure to liability. However,
the court pointed out that this construction does not include
every risk that is not specifically excluded.
The provisions of the policy purchased by Bender were
threefold, including hull, liability !protection and indemnity!
and general conditions. Excluded from coverage under general
condttions was 'delay or disruption of any type whatsoever,
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